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Spectacle and Secrecy: Press Coverage of Conjoined
Twins in 1950s Britain
KELLY LOUGHLIN*
In the early 1950s, when the National Health Service (NHS) was still in its infancy, the
British public was gripped by news reports of two attempts at the surgical separation of
conjoined twins. The first operation involved one-year-old twin girls from Kano, Nigeria.
Thetwins were xiphopagus(joinedatthelowersternum)andsharedaliver, separation was
attempted at London’s Hammersmith Hospital in December 1953. One child survived. In
February 1955 news broke of the birth of craniophagus twins (joined at the head) in
Keighley, West Yorkshire. Separation of the month-old girls was attempted at London’s
University College Hospital, but neither child survived.
Today, medical ethics and disability-politics increasingly provide the matrix for public
debate about the surgical separation of conjoined twins. ‘‘Sacrifice surgery’’ is the term
now used to describe interventions that will inevitably result in the death of one child.
1
Even in cases where separation does not imply sacrifice, the emergence of new perspec-
tives on ‘‘disability’’ are now questioning the assumption that separation is a preferable
state.
2 The public debate provoked by the Kano and Keighley cases was the product of a
markedly different context. The ethics of the procedure itself were never an issue, because
the conditions for the possibility of such a debate had yet to arrive.
3 Ethical concerns were
mobilized in relation to the Kano and Keighley cases, but they focused exclusively on the
nature of medicine’s own professional ethics and matters of confidentiality. What
prompted these specific concerns was the intense level of press interest in the twins
and the medical personnel involved in the operations. In the context of the 1950s it
was medical communication rather than surgical separation that was considered contro-
versial, unethical and in need of regulation.
The Kano and Keighley cases open up a number of interesting questions about British
medicine in the early years of the NHS. In what ways did the new service, and its
nationalized hospitals, impact on the nature and development of medicine’s professional
ethics, or on relations between the medical profession and the popular press?
These questions were raised in debates about press coverage of the twins; it was the
popular representation of these cases that became the source of controversy and a site
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197for mobilizing claims about ethical behaviour. Matters of communication, information-
control and ‘‘image-management’’ were therefore an important and potentially proble-
matic aspect of the new service. These questions are examined here through a range of
documents, including press reports, the minutes of a confidential enquiry into the press
coverage convened by the British Medical Association (BMA), oral and written testimony
supplied to the enquiry, and accounts written after the event by key participants. The
controversy over the representation of these cases emerges as an important episode in the
development of the relationship between medicine and the media in post-war Britain, and
highlights the distinction accorded to doctors and hospitals as sources of ‘‘medical news’’
due in large part to claims about confidentiality.
The spectacle and secrecy aroused by the two operations opens up an area which is best
analysed through a number of overlapping frames. Sociological analyses of mass media
provide the idea of ‘‘source–media relations’’.
4 As the term suggests, it seeks to highlight
the role of media sources (press officers, public relations personnel, campaigners and a
rangeof‘‘experts’’)andplacethemindynamicrelationshipwithmediaproducers(journal-
ists, editors, news organizations). Recent studies have demonstrated the importance of
sourcestrategiesinaccountingforthenewsagendavis-a `-visHIV/AIDSandenvironmental
issues inthe UK.
5Asimilar,sociologicallyderived frame,specifictoscientificculture,has
been developed byStephenHilgartner.Hilgartner’sworkonAmerica’sNationalAcademy
of Science moves beyond an analysis of texts to explore the ‘‘social machinery of informa-
tion control’’, through which expertise and scientific credibility is publicly performed,
maintained or contested, through the use of techniques like the press release and press
conference.
6
These frames point to the centrality of a dynamic, social machinery of information
control, which is essential to the public communication of expert knowledge claims in
contemporary,media-soakedcultures. Historically, however,we know verylittleabout the
development of source–media relations over time.
7 On the other hand, Hilgartner’s
dramaturgical perspective, through which contemporary scientific expertise is ‘‘publicly
performed’’ suggests an obvious link with older traditions of medical showmanship when
surgery and clinical demonstration were forms of public theatre.
8 Here, I argue that the
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Kelly LoughlinKano and Keighley cases resonate with these older traditions, but the furore they caused
also points forward to a newer emergent machinery of source–media relations character-
istic of the post-war years.
The Glare of Publicity: Patients and Surgeons in the Press
ThecaseoftheKanotwinsandthatoftheKeighleytwinswereverydifferent,intermsof
the families involved and the outcome of the medical interventions. These stories became
inextricably linked, however, through the involvement of Professor Ian Aird, Head of
Surgery at London’s Hammersmith Hospital. Aird led the surgical team that performed the
operation on the Kano twins and, although he was not directly involved in the second
operation, he had personal connections with the family. Aird became a key player in the
controversy which developed over press activity surrounding the two cases; much of the
available documentary evidence concerning these events is contained in the several
accounts he produced. He sent a report detailing press intrusion to the Central Ethical
Committee(CEC)oftheBritishMedicalAssociation(BMA);hetookhiscomplaintstothe
letters pages of the British Medical Journal and the national press; and the episode was
covered in a chapter of his biography.
9 From these and other available accounts there
emerges a picture of fierce struggles to control stories of surgical success and failure and
the celebrity attending them.
In the case ofthe Kanotwins, an ex-Hammersmith student,workinginNigeria,seems to
have informed Aird of the twins’ condition. The father of the twins worked for the United
Africa Company (UAC) and this commercial organization paid for the girls and their
mothertoflytoLondon.Thereisnoevidenceofhowthepressknewaboutthearrivalofthe
family and the purpose of their visit. Interestingly, UAC also offered the services of their
press office to handle any publicity arising from the case. Journalists and photographers
greeted the arrival of the Nigerian family at the airport and became a permanent presence
at the hospital throughout their stay. The front page of the Fulham & Hammersmith
Advertiser declared on 21 November 1953, ‘‘SIAMESE TWINS ARE IN HAMMERSMITH
HOSPITAL—Tests being carried out with a view to separation’’.
10 On the day of the opera-
tion (3 December) the fate of the Kano girls gripped the nation’s attention. Members of the
public joined the press throng outside Hammersmith Hospital waiting to hear news of the
outcome and meet copy deadlines for the afternoon editions. Less acceptable, however,
were episodes in which journalists and photographers entered the hospital wearing white
coats and managed to convince a matron they were working there. In this way they
introduction of inhalation anaesthesia to early
Victorian London’, Soc. Hist. Med., 1991, 4: 1–27.
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of the Joint Conference). Aird’s correspondence is
contained in Exploratory meeting held 29th March
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(private and confidential), PR (press) B, summary of
preceding events; PR (press) C3, comments and
correspondence in press, British Medical Journal,
Daily Telegraph 1955, general press comments,
miscellaneouscomment.‘Presspublicity’,letterfromI
Aird, Br. med. J., 1954, i: 153; ‘Doctors and the press’,
letter from I Aird, Br. med. J., 1955, i: 1028–9;
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199
Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s Britainobtained photographs of the children, which subsequently appeared in the press; hospital
windows had to be blacked out to prevent further surreptitious picture-taking. Under the
banner headline ‘‘THE TWINS NIGHT CRISIS—one dies, battle for the other continues’’, the
Daily Sketch’s front page of 4 December showed photographs of both twins, their mother,
and Mr H Woodford Davies, the anaesthetist, as he left the hospital.
11 Aird too became the
focus of press attention. Police were called to clear journalists who besieged his home and
that of his elderly parents—the latter had been asked for photographs of the celebrity
surgeon. Furthermore, according to Aird, the mother of the twins was so alarmed at press
reports of the dangers of the operation that she had considered withdrawing and returning
to Nigeria.
12
These and other incidents prompted Aird to write to the BMA’s ethical committee,
setting-outwhathadhappened,andtowritetotheBritishMedicalJournalsuggestingways
of managing the press interest. The journal responded with an editorial on ‘The press and
the profession’.
13 Aird’s need to set the record straight with the BMA was necessitated by
the rule of professional anonymity which governed doctors’ relationship with the media at
this time. This rule and its management were also addressed in the British Medical Journal
letter and editorial. Professional anonymity was enshrined in the ethical guidelines of the
General Medical Council (GMC)—namely its edict against indirect advertising, a practice
deemed ungentlemanly and likely to bring the profession into disrepute.
14 The edict
against indirect advertising emerged at the close of the nineteenth century as a charac-
ter-based marker of professional values, serving to distinguish and demarcate doctors from
unlicensed practitioners: medicine was a gentlemanly profession, not a trade to be plied
through open competition in the marketplace. Anonymity had to be maintained when
dealing with the media, and allowing oneself to be named in the press could and did
lead to accusations of unfair advantage and result in a hearing before the GMC for the
publicity-seeking doctor. This rule was supported by the ethical committee of the BMA
throughout the 1950s and beyond.
15
However, Aird’s brush with publicity did not end with the departure of the surviving
Kano twin, as news broke just a year later (January 1955) of conjoined twins born in
Keighley, West Yorkshire. These twin girls were at the opposite end of the social spectrum
from the Kano twins. Born into a family with strong medical connections, the twins left
Yorkshire for London, and surgery, within a month of their birth, just as the press got wind
oftheirexistence.Inthiscasetheparentsandthedoctorsdemanded andexpectedcomplete
anonymity, entering into elaborate ruses to conceal the whereabouts of the children.
11Daily Sketch, Frid., 4 Dec. 1953, p. 1.
12McLeave, op. cit., note 9 above, pp. 176–94.
13Letter from I Aird, Br med. J., 1954, i: 153; ‘The
press and the profession’, Br. med. J., 1954, i: 141–2.
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Kelly LoughlinThe brother of the twins’ father was a Harley Street surgeon and close friend of Aird.
Initially the twins were brought to Harley Street for examination where arrangements were
made, on Aird’s suggestion, for Geoffrey Knight, a neurosurgeon at Brook Hospital,
Woolwich, to attempt separation. The press descended on Harley Street and the children
were smuggledout through aside entrancewhile journalists gave chase toa ‘‘dummy’’car.
Another change of cars took place but the children never reached the Brook Hospital.
Knight withdrew from the operation citing the pressure of press activity as his reason. Aird
then persuaded Mr Julian Taylor to attempt the surgery at University College Hospital
(UCH).
16
The surgery was not successful and both children died. Following the operation, a
hospital administrator issued a statement to the Press Association on 23 February 1955
suggesting that press activityhad influenced the outcome. Thisaccusation provoked furore
inthepress.Undertheheadline‘‘TragedyoftheSiamesetwins’’,theDailyMirrorreported
that Mr Julian Taylor saw the statement as ‘‘ridiculous’’, and continued: ‘‘Mr Geoffrey
Knight stated last night that neither he nor Professor Aird was consulted before the
statement was made’’. Sir Alexander Maxwell, chair of the governors at UCH was quoted
as saying, ‘‘I don’t think anyone, certainly not my hospital, could possibly blame the Press
fortheunfortunatedeathofthesetwins’’.KennethRobinson,MemberofParliamentforthe
borough served by UCH, a doctor and member of the North West Metropolitan Hospital
Board, added, ‘‘I cannot believe that any hospital would be deflected from doing what is
best for its patients by any outside circumstances such as comment or action by the
Press’’.
17 It would seem that the statement was badly handled and issued without due
consultation.Nevertheless,theflurryofheadlines,accusationsandconfusionthatfollowed
prompted Aird to give a named interview to the Observer on 27 February 1955, an event
which pushed the BMA into action.
18
The BMA sought to address the problem of the press and the profession by convening a
conference, the Joint Conference of the Representatives of the Press and the Medical
Profession.
19 The Conference met six times between April 1955 and May 1956,
with an initial exploratory meeting taking place at the end of March 1955. Medical
relations with the press and with broadcasting had been monitored for some time by
the Association’s Central Ethical Committee (CEC) and its Public Relations Committee
(PRC).However,pressure forameetingwith keyelements inthenewspaperindustrycame
in this instance from representatives of hospital based medicine, the BMA’s Consultants
Committee (CC). After all, it was hospital news at issue, news that affected a powerful
group within the BMA and the NHS. Members of the CC, the CEC and the Council of the
BMA participated in the Joint Conference, organized largely by John Pringle, head of the
BMA’s press office and chaired by Sir Guy Dain of the PRC.
20 Sir Linton Andrews, editor
of the Yorkshire Post and chair of the new Press Council led the assembled representatives
16These events are detailed in McLeave, op. cit.,
note 9 above, pp. 192–4, and in Records of Joint
Conference, 29 March1955, PR (press) B, summaryof
preceding events.
17‘Tragedy of the Siamese twins’, Daily Mirror,
26Feb.1955,pressclippingcontainedinRecordsofthe
Joint Conference, PR (press) C3.
18Recordsofthe JointConference,29March1955,
PR (press) C3, general press content, 1955.
19The BMA issuedthe invitationon 8 March1955.
20On John Pringle and the BMA press office at this
time, see K Loughlin, ‘Your life in their hands: the
context of a medical-media controversy’, Media Hist.,
2000, 6: 177–88.
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Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s Britainof the press: National Union of Journalists, Institute of Journalists, Press Association,
Newspaper Society, Guild of British Newspaper Editors, Periodical Proprietors’ Associa-
tion, and Newspaper Proprietors’ Association. The Ministry of Health was represented by
their press officer, Stephen Heald, although his position was that of an observer. BBC
Radio and BBC Television Talks were also represented, but their input was minimal.
Through its deliberations on evidence and opinions presented by representatives of both
professions, the Joint Conference formulated a ‘‘routine procedure’’ for the release of
information from hospitals. This was accepted by the Ministry of Health and issued as a
circular to hospital management boards in July 1956.
21 The circular and an ‘‘explanatory
memorandum’’ offered guidelines on the form and timing of information released from
hospitals to the press, and recommended that each hospital or group of hospitals should
designate an appointed person to deal with press inquiries, a system already operating in
some hospitals. The importance of this position was emphasized by the statement that ‘‘on
no account should this duty be left to porters, telephone operators, or junior medical,
nursing or clerical staff’’. The circular urged that the appointed people build relationships
withthelocalpress,andofferedsuggestionssuchasarotaofdesignatedcontactstoprovide
twenty-four-hour cover, and that the accreditation of journalists who appeared unan-
nounced at the hospital be checked. The patient’s right to confidentiality was the principle
governing the release of any information, managed in relation to the practicalities of
different cases. Ordinarily, the communication of any information above a simple
acknowledgement that a certain person had been admitted to the hospital, along with a
brief comment on his/her condition (poorly, comfortable, doing well) rested with the
patient, and his/her consent was required. Indeed, even in cases where the patient’s
presence in the hospital was common knowledge, if he/she asked the hospital to deny
it then ‘‘no comment’’ was described as the safest response to inquiries.
22
With its emphasis on the primacy of the patient’s right to confidentiality, the routine
procedurecouldbeseenasthetriumphaloutcomeofthesagaofthetwins,thepressinterest
they attracted, and the efforts of Aird to protect his and their privacy. Indeed, this much is
claimed in Aird’s biography, where his criticism of the press ‘‘caused the British Medical
Association to convene a representative meeting ... The surgeon’s recommendations
about the patient’s and the doctor’s rights were written into a code of behaviour which
hospital and journalists could follow in cases like that of Siamese twins’’.
23 Looked at in
this way, the episode has a timeless quality about it, a familiar tale of press sensationalism
and the intrinsic newsworthiness of a novel surgical procedure. However, an element
of historical and contextual specificity snags the sense of timelessness and inevit-
ability attributed to events that attract the epithet ‘‘media circus’’. At this time the
confidentiality question regarding media coverage of medicine had two aspects—
confidentiality and professional anonymity. The specifics of this professional ethic are
21Routine procedure for the release of information
from hospitals, Ministry of Health circular number
HM (56) 58. The text of this circular was printed
in the British Medical Journal, ‘Doctors and the press,
news about hospital patients’, Br. med. J., 1955,
ii: supplement, pp. 100–2 ; see also ‘Hospitals and the
press: recommended routine at hospitals, Monthly
Circular of the Newspaper Society, Aug. 1956,
pp. 197–8.
22Routine procedure, op. cit., note 21 above;
‘Doctors and the press’, Br. med. J., 1955,
ii: supplement, p. 101.
23McLeave, op. cit., note 9 above,
p. 194.
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Kelly Loughlincentral to understanding the saga of the twins as a key episode in the development of
medical-media relations in Britain.
Keeping Secrets and Telling Stories
In the context of the 1950s, professional anonymity was as important a means of
controlling information as patient confidentiality. In shunning personal publicity and
demanding anonymity for medical practitioners, this rule helped to foster a particular
public image of medicine: as the impersonal, disinterested voice of expertise. This
image was endangered during the saga of the conjoined twins, as surgical celebrity proved
difficult to manage. Aird’s interview with the Observer, which came after a year in which
his name had become inextricably linked with the spectacleof conjoinedtwins, ran the risk
ofbeingtakenasanexerciseinself-promotion,‘‘Oh,Ian’satitagain...makingcapitalout
of Siamese twins’’.
24 Aird’s actions however were not so much an attempt to court popular
publicity but to control the representation of a high profile surgical event.
Patient confidentiality and professional anonymity had very different fortunes in the
Kano and Keighley cases. Indeed, members of the Joint Conference who heard Aird’s
evidence noted the ‘‘apparent inconsistency between his respective attitude to the two
cases’’.
25 The precise nature of this inconsistency is unclear, but presumably the reference
is to the layers of social, colonial and ethnic difference that structured Aird’s presentation.
For example, it is clear that the Kano family had much less control over their story than the
Keighley family. The involvement of a commercial company and its press office signal the
capital that could be made from the conjoined twins, and their arrival in London was
certainly not a secret. Aird praised the work of the United Africa Company, stating that the
‘‘situationimprovedimmeasurably’’oncehehadtakenuptheofferoftheirpublicrelations
office:
I satisfied ethical requirements by not giving any information whatever to the press directly but by
giving the company concerned a report of their patient from time to time ...at their discretion they
furnished what particulars they thought were suitable to the press ...[and] ...my hospital and I
could have remained anonymous if the press had not already been in possession of my name before
the arrangement [with the press office].
26
Despite the UAC’s financial involvement, the Kano twins were in no way ‘‘their patient’’,
they were Aird’s, and his argument that ‘‘part of our responsibility was to a great public
company’’was unacceptable to many.
27 One correspondent in The Times stated,‘‘A doctor
is expected so to act that the general public will feel assured that he and his colleagues will
regard the patient’s best interests as of paramount importance irrespective of pressure
applied by outside parties or of economic, racial or religious considerations’’.
28 The
decision to use the services of a commercial company as an intermediary was also
criticized by contemporaries.
29 John Pringle, the BMA’s press and public relations man,
24Ibid., p. 193.
25Records of the Joint Conference, 26 July 1955,
Press 25–26 July and general memos.
26I Airdletterto Br.med.J.,1954,i: 153,emphasis
added.
27Ibid.
28Records of the Joint Conference, 12 July 1955,
PR (press) 3, correspondence in The Times,
‘Profession and the press’, letter from R Forbes,
Secretary of the Medical Defence Union,
1 March 1955.
29McLeave, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 179.
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Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s Britainwas one of the first to respond to Aird’s Observer interview and its condemnation of the
press, pointing out that the services of his press office had been offered during both cases
andnottakenup.
30JournalistscoveringmedicineandtheNHSwrotetotheBritishMedical
Journal, expressing their surprise that Pringle had been turned down in favour of a
commercial company, suggesting this decision might account for the poor management.
31
Moreover, from available accounts it seems that Aird was much more active in seeking to
manage the press than was the UAC, and it could be argued that the BMA’s press office
would have restricted his activity.
It was Aird who arranged a press conference in which journalists were allowed to
question and photograph the mother of the twins, and some journalists reported his will-
ingness to talk to ‘‘reputable’’ members of the press.
32 Furthermore, and despite his
expressed contempt for those publications bidding for an exclusive interview with the
mother, it was Aird who brokered a deal with a magazine for her story—the £100 proceeds
went to the family.
33 Aird’s involvement with the press is understandable, as public
representations of the case were inevitably representations of his standing as a surgeon.
In many respects this was his story: ‘‘Hundreds of letters reached the Professor’s office—
from groups of people in factories and offices, from friends and former patients, from
ordinary members of the public. In Nigeria, special prayers were said for the Professor’’.
34
This extract from Aird’s biography conveys the sense of drama and expectation that
surrounded the Kano operation, whereby ‘‘Aird and his staff felt as though they were
taking their professional lives in their hands; it was as though they had chosen to operate in
front of the BBC television cameras at Lime Grove a few hundred yards from their
hospital’’.
35 This impression was understandable given that the operating theatre was
packed to capacity with surgical teams, a large medical audience and a full film crew.
When preparing for the operation, Aird viewed a Canadian film of an unsuccessful attempt
at separation and arranged for his own attempt to be recorded for posterity. The film was
later screened at a special meeting of the Royal Society of Medicine and, although two
full surgical teams participated in the operation, Aird’s voice provided the commentary.
36
The film and the equally crafted clinical report to the medical journals were formats in
which Aird controlled the story of his groundbreaking operation—the shape of the narra-
tive and the timing of its release.
37 Media interest undermined this control, by raising
expectations and framing the narrative in terms of success or failure.
The Keighley twins presented a very different situation, with more socially powerful
parents and a much lower chance of either child surviving surgery. There was no film or
30Letter from John Pringle, The Times,
2 March 1955, p. 9.
31‘Press publicity’, letter from John Prince,
Br. med. J., 1954, i: 216; ‘Doctors and the press’, letter
from Alfred Byrne, Br. med. J., 1955, i: 791–2.
32Onthephotographs,seeMcLeave,op.cit.,note9
above, p. 189, and Aird’s response to medical
correspondent Alfred Byrne, letter from I Aird, Br.
med.J.,1955,i: 1028–9.Aird’soffthe recordbriefings
of some journalists are also mentioned by R Bedford,
science reporter for the Daily Mirror at the time of
the Kano twins, R Bedford, ‘Medicine and the
media: the need to strengthen the bridge’, J. R. Coll.
Physicians Lond., 1979, 13: 7–14, p. 14.
33Onthemagazinedeal,seeMcLeave,op.cit.,note
9 above, p.189, and Aird’s response to Alfred Byrne,
letter from I Aird, Br. med. J., 1955, i: 1028–9.
34McLeave, op. cit., note 9 above, p. 184.
35Ibid.
36S Schofield and M Essex-Lopresti, ‘The
conjoined twins of Kano’, Science and Film, 1954, 3:
19–23.
37I Aird, ‘The conjoined twins of Kano’, Br. med.
J., 1954, i: 831–7.
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Kelly Loughlinpublished clinical report of this operation. Given the expected outcome for the girls it
is easy to understand Geoffrey Knight’s retreat in the face of press interest similar to
that attracted by Aird at Hammersmith. The Brook Hospital received an estimated
300 telephone calls on the day the children were believed to be there, and by midday
some thirty reporters were at the gates.
38 Confidentiality was demanded and expected
by the Keighley family, and it was the inability to keep this secret that prompted Aird’s
named interview in the press, and was a key issue in the Joint Conference. In effect,
Aird sacrificed his professional anonymity (the named interview) in defence of
patient confidentiality. This tactic demonstrates the nature of the relation between anon-
ymity and confidentiality in the context of the 1950s. Following David Vincent’s study of
secrecy as ‘‘blocked communication’’, anonymity and confidentiality can be seen as
performing the same function, that of withholding information, an act which becomes
‘‘atonceaclaimtoprobityandademandfordeference—itimpliesasenseofresponsibility
which arises from and defines a position of moral authority’’.
39 In one sense therefore,
Aird’s sacrifice was a means of enhancing the moral rectitude required of a keeper of
secrets.
In the eyes of the Joint Conference however, it is arguable whether Aird’s tactic was
entirely successful. It has already been noted that members of the conference expressed
concern at what they saw as Aird’s different attitude towards confidentiality in the Kano
andKeighleycases—anditisdifficulttoreadcertainpassagesinthememorandumwithout
thinkingofAird,‘‘apatient’sillnessoughttobethepatient’sownpersonalsecret,wherehe
[sic] wishes secrecy and where secrecy can be maintained. In no way is the secret the
personal ‘property’ ...of his medical attendants, of the nurses or of the hospital autho-
rities’’.
40 The memorandum went on to suggest co-operation in ‘‘exceptional cases’’,
namely:
take the Press into the hospital’s confidence and explain frankly why publication would not be in
the patient’s interest or is, for some other cogent reason, undesirable. To refuse information when
no good reason exists, or to show an obstructive attitude in dealing with Press inquiries ... is
unwise and harmful to the interests both of the patient and of the hospital service.
41
The regulation of the conduct of Aird or any other physician was not the job of the
Conference or the routine procedure, professional ethics were a matter for the GMC and
toalesserextenttheBMAproper.ThereisnoevidencethatAirdwasformallycensuredfor
his media appearances, reinforcing the impression amongst medicine’s rank and file that
the profession’s e ´lite were exempt from the edict against indirect advertising. Ritchie
Calder, a journalist and Chair of the Association of British Science Writers, noted that,
‘‘journalists, like the public, do not quite understand why certain doctors when they attain
eminence seem to be outside this ethic, and, while not directly encouraging publicity, do
not exactly discourage it’’.
42 A subsequent letter to the British Medical Journal added that,
38Records of the Joint Conference, 12 July 1955,
PR (press) 20, report by Dr Armstrong
(Brook Hospital).
39David Vincent, The culture of secrecy:
Britain, 1932–1998, Oxford University Press,
1998, p. 15.
40‘Doctors and the press’, explanatory
memorandum, Br. med. J., 1955, ii: supplement,
pp. 100–2, p. 101.
41Ibid., p. 102.
42‘Press publicity’, letter from R Calder, Br. med.
J., 1954, i: 271–2, p. 272.
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43 The e ´lite in this context were hospital
consultants and/or society doctors with notable clients, such as Churchill’s doctor Lord
Moran. As the terms of the memorandum and the routine procedure clearly indicate, the
BMA’schiefroleintheConferencewas torepresentmembersoftheprofessionworkingin
hospitals. That the routine procedure was addressed specifically to ‘‘news from hospitals’’
provides a clear indication that issues of medical communication raised by the Kano and
KeighleycaseswerepartoftheprofessionalandorganizationaltensionsoftheyoungNHS.
Secrecy in a New Context
The early decades of the NHS were marked by a number of professional and organiza-
tional tensions. A key matter of concern was the growing division in resources and status
betweenacutehospitalservicesandwhatwouldnowbedescribedasprimarycareservices,
such as general practice.
44 Furthermore, the rise of the NHS consultant took place in a
context where questions of administration and organization were an on-going problem.
45
The prominence of such issues points to the significance of the transformation wrought by
the NHS, which altered the ownership of hospitals and professional relationships within
and beyond their walls. Hospitals with different management structures and different
traditions, which had formed an essentially local pattern of hospital provision, were
now brought within a national service.
46 These matters were a recurrent theme in
BMA discussions and the controversy over hospitals and the press took place in the
midst of these changes. Evidence presented to the Joint Conference spoke directly to
these tensions. One participant, the Newspaper Society, produced results from a survey
it had conducted on relations between the hospitals and the provincial press: ‘‘We are very
hurt by the development, in some areas, of what amounts to a state of ‘cold war’ between
hospitals and the local press’’.
47 Medical and media spokesmen stated the value of strong
links with the press during the period of the voluntary hospitals. The Guild of British
Newspaper Editors claimed: ‘‘Before the National Health Service, relationships between
newspapers and hospitals were altogether cordial ...The newspapers had played a great
and honourable part in raising money for the voluntary hospitals, and the hospitals repaid
them by co-operating in every reasonable way.’’
48
Nationalization was identified as the culprit, particularly the distant attitude of new
management committees and a lack of clarity about who could, or indeed whether anyone
should, speak tothe press.Evidenceofconfusion andthe stateofcold warwas presented to
theConferencebyareporterwhotriedtocovertheKeighleycaseforanationalnewspaper:
From the moment the story broke in the stop press of the Bradford Telegraph & Argos reporters
were confronted with officialdom at its worst. The story itself began with a denial that the twins had
43‘Press publicity’, letter from J Clapham Coates,
Br. med. J., 1954, i: 518.
44I Loudon, J Horder and C Webster (eds),
General practice under the National Health Service,
1948–1997, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998.
45CWebster,Thehealthservicessincethewar,vol.
2: Government and health care, the National Health
Service, 1958–1979, London, The Stationery Office,
1996; G Rivett, From cradle to grave: fifty
years of the NHS, London, King’s Fund, 1999.
46C Webster, ‘Local government and health care:
the historical perspective’, Br. med. J., 1995, 310:
1584–87.
47Records of Joint Conference, 12 July 1955,
PR (press) 4, Hospitals and the press, contains
transcript of meeting with the press 29 March 1955,
contribution by J L Palmer of the Newspaper
Society.
48Ibid., statement by D Prosser, Guild of British
Newspaper Editors.
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Kelly Loughlinbeen born at all. Statements were made by the Medical Officer of Health and the Town Clerk of
Keighley. One said, ‘‘No twins have been born’’, the other said, ‘‘We cannot say anything about it
at the moment.’’
49
The hospital, like the other official sources he approached, was neither willing to
confirm or deny the birth. The journalist then made enquiries in the town and identified
women who had recently given birth in the hospital. In this way he discovered the name of
the twins’ mother, but not the address of the family. Finally he sought out hospital cleaners
and porters who confirmed the facts of the case and divulged that the children had left
Keighley and were going to be separated. The family’s address was finally established
from the town’s electoral register. At this stage the reporter returned to the hospital for a
promised press conference, which never materialized.
The claims of newspaper organizations point to a change in the dependency of the
relationships between hospitals and their local press. Testimony supplied by an individual
journalist, taken alongside other accounts of ‘‘the press and the twins’’, suggests that an
absence of official information resulted in reporters having greater recourse to different
sources(cleaners)anddifferentkindsofinformation(newsaboutthedoctorasreplacement
for news about the patient). This begs the question of why the hospital had become
problematic as a source of news? One element present in debates about coverage of
the twins, which suggests a significant constraint on the hospital as news-source, was
an insistence on anonymity for the hospital as well as the surgeon, a kind of extended
anonymity. This is apparent in Aird’s comments about the UAC’s press office improving
the situation regarding the Kano twins, where he states that had they been used earlier
‘‘my hospital and I could have remained anonymous’’. Indeed, in his promotion of such
intermediaries, he saw them as providing a route ‘‘for hospitals to provide the press
anonymously with a certain amount of information’’. Likewise, the routine procedure
described an obstructive attitude to the press as ‘‘harmful to the interests both of the
patient and the hospital service’’, not individual hospitals or doctors.
50 It seems that
the rule against indirect advertising, which sought to eliminate unfair advantage, had
been stretched to include individual hospitals.
Thisstretchingofanonymitydevelopedpost-NHS;asdelegatestotheConferencenoted,
publicity was an essential part of most hospitals before 1948.
51 The idea of an anonymous
hospitalacting asasourceofnewswasclearlynotpracticable orachievable.Moreover,the
credence given to the idea of extended anonymity points to the ambiguity surrounding the
communicative possibilities of NHS hospitals. A pattern of local press relations may well
have broken down with the advent of the national service. The routine procedure was
therefore an attempt to re-build these relations by offering practical suggestions and
guidelines on the ethical principles governing release of patient information. After all,
the issue of communicative authority and more general matters of information control had
49RecordsoftheJointConference,29March1955,
Exploratory meeting held 29 March 1955, notes for
advance meeting of medical side (private and
confidential, PR (press) B, summary of preceding
events, confidential report from a staff reporter.
50‘Doctors and the press, news about hospital
patients’, Br. med. J., 1955, ii: supplement, p. 102.
51Indeed, publicity was central to the old
voluntary hospitals, see, for example, J E Stone,
Appeals for funds and hospital publicity:
a practical guide for hospitals and other
charitable organisations, Birmingham, Birkbeck,
1934.
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Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s Britainnot been sufficiently addressed in the planning and implementation of the new service.
Modes of information control (confidentiality, anonymity) were the core of medical-
ethical debate at this time. In the context of nationalized hospitals and a salaried medical
service, this oversight constituted a highly productive space in which the authority of the
medical profession could be publicly enacted.
Disputes regarding ownership of and access to medical records had emerged in relation
tothe introduction ofNationalInsuranceinthe early part ofthe century,and theseconflicts
continued with the development of the NHS.
52 The sanctity of the doctor–patient relation-
ship and the ethical bonds that structured it were increasingly brought to the fore post-
NHS.
53 The issue was plainly stated in a British Medical Journal editorial about publicity
arising from ‘Doctors on the air’ in 1956:
There has been a drift away from traditional medical ethics since the introduction of the NHS ...if
this is not checked the profession will insensibly lose its own self respect, and the respect of the
public which clamours for sensation and the vulgarity of personal publicity. Now that one of the
great professions is in the grips of a State-provided service—is to all intents and purposes
nationalized—it must hold fast more firmly than ever to the decencies of professional behaviour.
54
This could be read as so much bluff and bluster, the BMA reaching for the moral high
ground of professional ethics. However, the Joint Conference, and the saga of the twins
indicates a good deal of confusion about managing medical secrecy (the essence of the
professional ethic) within the context of the hospital service.
Part of the ‘‘traditional medical ethics’’ referred to above was a model of medical
confidentiality based on an individual doctor engaged in a private and enclosed relation-
ship with an individual patient. The significant exception to this was legislation on
notifiable diseases, but apart from this the model remained intact throughout much of the
post-war period. And yet Aird himself spoke of the difficulty of maintaining secrecy in a
modern hospital, ‘‘leakage is almost inevitable in a community where many of the relevant
medical facts are known to hundreds of people’’.
55 He argued that such leaks affected the
morale of staff and created an atmosphere of suspicion. This point was echoed at the
opening of the Joint Conference by the chair of the medical side, Sir Guy Dain, who stated:
We are in further difficulty in regard to the leakage of personal details of hospital cases because
although nurses accept the same standards of secrecy as doctors ...that does not necessarily apply
to all hospital staff. There are very large staffs of people of all kinds, such as porters and others,
who may pick up news and there is risk that they, as amateurs or paid informants, may spread news
which is incomplete or garbled.
56
The large, modern hospital presented the problem of extended confidentiality. This
problem found its clearest expression some two decades later, in BMA evidence to the
52Report of BMA’s CEC, including section on
‘‘professional secrecy’’, where the ethical problems
raised by government departments seeking access to
medical records, ‘Medical ethics’, Br. med. J., 1951,
i: supplement, pp. 260–1; see also ‘Professional
secrecy’, Br. med. J., 1952, ii: supplement, pp. 52–3.
53D Armstrong, ‘The doctor–patient relationship,
1930–80’, in P Wright and A Treacher (eds),
The problem of medical knowledge: examining the
social construction of medicine, Edinburgh University
Press, 1982, pp. 109–22.
54‘Doctors on the air’, Br. med. J., 1956, i: 388–9,
p. 235.
55Letter from I Aird, Br. med. J., 1954, i: 153.
56Report of Joint Conference, 12 July 1955, PR
(press) 4, hospitals and the press, contains transcript of
meeting with press 29 March 1955, contribution by
G Dain.
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Kelly LoughlinYounger Committee on Privacy (1972). Here, it was deemed no longer practical to look
upon the single physician as the patient’s sole confidant in a serious illness, ‘‘it is assumed
by public and profession alike that any contact with the complex medical machinery
of today implies acquiesence in some degree of extended confidence’’.
57 This is not to
suggest that the NHS created the problem of extended confidentiality. After all, medical
officers of life assurance firms and panel doctors providing certification for sickness
benefit all compromised on confidentiality—to a certain extent. In the 1950s however,
this problem was highlighted for specialists in the context of the new hospital system.
Concern about leaksand paid informants(cleaners, porters) amongst hospital staff was a
particular theme during this controversy. The ‘‘disreputable’’ nature of these employees,
along with their low socio-economic status stood in stark contrast to gentlemanly doctors,
seeking to keep their ethical code despite the fact that ‘‘they’re employees now ...either
full-time salaried or receiving payments for their services at hospitals ... [T]hey were
voluntary workers, but now they are employees of the hospital’’.
58 A gentlemanly and
class-cultural concern with public clamour for sensation and vulgarity found a ready
audience at this time, due to developments within the press. The 1950s saw moves towards
greater professionalization within journalism, indicated by the emergence of specialist
reporters covering fields like medicine and the NHS; mentioned above. Equally significant
were other post-war developments like the formation of the Association of British Science
Writers (1947); a professional association of specialist reporters.
59 The General Council of
the Press also came into being at this time (1953) as an outcome of the first Royal
Commission on the Press (1947–9).
60 The Press Council issued its first report in October
1954, and although the Council did not meet the expectations of many, its appearance and
publications served as a focus for debate about press standards. Indeed, one of the Coun-
cil’s first statements was on the conjoined twins, not surprising considering that its Chair,
Sir Linton Andrews, was a member of the Joint Conference.
61
In a letter to the Daily Telegraph entitled ‘Jackals of the Press’, the Earl of Selborne
launched a particularly scathing attack on the popular press. Amidst his demands that the
Press Council be given teeth, medical reporting was linked with rumour and scandal:
These organs [the gutter press] specialize in exploiting every conceivable morbid sensation,
whether it can be extracted from the scum of the police courts, from divorce proceedings, from
murders and other crimes ...from accidents or even operations and confinements ...They pry into
hospital wards and subject surgeons, engaged in the most critical cases, to third degree
interrogations.
62
57Vincent, op. cit., note 39 above, p. 235.
58RecordsofJointConference,PR(press)4,Report
of meeting 29 March 1955, statement by Dr Woolley.
59On the development of specialist reporters
coveringmedicine,seeKLoughlin,‘Networksofmass
communication:reportingscience,healthandmedicine
from the 1950s to the 1970s’, in Berridge(ed.), op. cit.,
note 7 above, pp. 297–323.
60T O’Malley, ‘Demanding accountability: the
press, the Royal Commissions and the pressure for
reform, 1945–77’, in M Bromley and H Stephenson
(eds),Sex,liesanddemocracy:thepressandthepublic,
London, Longman, 1998, pp. 84–96.
61The statement was issued on 8 March 1955, a
copy is contained in the documentation of the Records
of the Joint Conference, Exploratory meeting
held 29 March 1955, notes for advance meeting of
medical side (private and confidential) PR (press) 2:
‘‘[The Council] recognises that serious ethical
questions are involved and favours the formulation of
some common principles and policy in gathering and
supplying news and photographs in medical cases’’.
62Records of the Joint Conference, Exploratory
meeting held 29 March 1955, notes for advance
meeting of medical side (private and confidential),
PR (press) B, summary of preceding events; PR
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Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s BritainAndrews himself caused a flurry of letters in The Times when he characterized the
activities of freelance reporters in the following manner: ‘‘harassing of the unfortunate by
unattached so-called journalists and photographers drawn into a news hunt by the prospect
of rich returns if they can get scoops by their audacity’’.
63 Representatives of these
journalists refuted this description and pointed to the directories of freelance reporters
maintained by the National Union of Journalists and a similar register held by the Institute
of Journalists.
64 The image of the scoop-driven freelance was the media counterpart to the
secret-spilling hospital porter. Such people may well have played a part in the publicity
surrounding the twins, but they were not the crux of the problem. In many respects these
figures can be seen as caricatures of broader patterns of change in medicine and in the
press.
Conclusion: Medicine and the Media Circus
Conjoined twins have always aroused public curiosity: as spectaclefor public exhibition
and more recently as part of the spectacle in high risk and increasingly contested surgical
intervention. However, the claims and counterclaims mobilized in relation to the 1950s
cases were highly context specific and time-bound. The material presented here demon-
strates that the crux of the dispute over media coverage of the twins was centred precisely
on the nature of source–media relations: the role of doctors and hospitals as sources of
popular news. Questions raised by medicine as popular news were framed as ethical
questions during the 1950s. Rules surrounding medical communication, especially the
idea of patient confidentiality, have a long history.
65 However, controversy about press
coverage of the conjoined twins provides an example of the way these ethical rules have
changedover time and inresponse to new circumstances: a point raised by Roger Cooter in
his review of histories of medical ethics. A concern with ethics comes to the fore in
medicine at moments when ‘‘individual practitioners or the profession as a whole felt
their social and legal status and authority under threat’’.
66 This has been shown in studies
of eighteenth-century British medicine, when rapid institutional, commercial and organi-
zational change began to pose ‘‘fresh problems regarding professional power, collective
responsibility, and the division of labor’’.
67
Professional-ethical concern over communication, publicity and especially advertising
seems to surface at times when medical practitioners experience such threats to social
status,professional and economicpower.For example,the edictagainst advertising, which
emerged at the close of the nineteenth century, was largely a response to the perceived
(press) C3, comments and correspondence in the press,
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64Ibid., PR (press) C3, comments and
correspondence in the press, correspondence in The
Times, letter from L G Rule, Chair, London Branch of
the National Union of Journalists, 5 March 1955; letter
from Brian R Roberts, President, Institute of
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Kelly Loughlinthreat posed by quacks, patent medicine and irregular practitioners who plied their trade in
the media. The response was class-cultural, an act of professional closure in which claims
to a gentlemanly profession deemed advertising to be unethical due to its association with
the market. Interestingly, competition from alternative practitioners also played a part in
theerosionoftheadvertisingbanformedicalspecialistsinthe1990s.Generalpractitioners
have been able to advertise directly to the public since 1990. When this privilege
was extended to specialists in 1996, part of the reason was the threat of non-medical
practitioners:
[D]octors who wanted to advertise such services as screening or acupuncture were regarded as
specialists and so could not advertise directly to the public. These doctors often complain that the
existing guidance is potentially damaging to patients because non-medically qualified practitioners
are able to advertise the same services.
68
In the context of the 1950s, a period characterized by the bedding down of the new
service, ethical debate focused on communication and its relationship to the profession’s
authority. The routine procedure sought to clarify ownership of the ‘‘secret’’ of a hospital
confinement:towhatextent didit belong tothe patient, physician orhospital.The outcome
of the Joint Conference was a clear articulation of the idea that an individual patient owned
the story of their illness—it was in no way the property of the physician or hospital.
However, patients could and did break the rules, compromising the physician’s role as
keeper of secrets, ‘‘If we withhold information, they give it—and so do their friends and
neighbours’’.
69 Concurrent with this was the further erosion of medical authority signalled
byextendedconfidentiality:wheresecretsareknownnotonlytothephysician,buttoavast
arrayofhospitalemployees.Thesedebates aboutmedicalcommunicationandprofessional
ethics are indicative of the new social relations brought into being by the NHS. By
comparison with other members of the profession, hospital consultants did very well in
the context of the NHS, but one should not overlook the scale of the transformation in
relationships between hospital doctors and their patients: they were ‘‘employees now’’.
70
Change in the social relations between doctors and patients, hospitals and the public was
a theme present in contributionsto the debateabout medical secrecy, ‘‘every citizen should
feel a full sense of responsibility for [the service] ... [this] cannot develop unless the
administrative and medical powers-that-be take the public intotheir confidence, stop being
secretive ...and start inviting consumers to offer their suggestions’’.
71 The role of the
pressinfacilitatinganewrelationshipbetweenthepublicandtheprofession wasequallyto
the fore in these debates: reflecting change within the media as well as medicine, ‘‘The
public would appreciate and benefit from more information about the medical services ...
The press could be a vital link’’.
72
Likemedicine,theBritishpressexperiencedsignificantdevelopmentintheorganization
of reporting practices and the management of information during the 1950s. The decade
saw a growth in public relations and journalists specializing in science and medicine.
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Press Coverage of Conjoined Twins in 1950s BritainIn later decades the close links between medical journalists and the public relations
function of medical organizations, such as the BMA, would come under scrutiny.
73 In
the context of the 1950s however, such links were championed as the way forward. Aird’s
independent stance, in refusing the help of John Pringle, was criticized by new specialist
reporters, such as John Prince and Alfred Byrne, who saw the BMA press office as, ‘‘the
clearing-house for an immense amount of reliable medical information which is given
promptly to the Press ...[and] promotes the best possible relations between the profession
and the Press’’.
74 Public relations developed later in the NHS and throughout individual
hospitals, although the subject of news from hospitals was guided by the routine procedure
through to the 1990s.
75
Old and new perspectives can be identified in the battle to control the telling of stories
and keeping of secrets in the Kano and Keighley cases. During the 1890s two young girls
born in India in 1889, Radica and Doddica, toured Europe as the conjoined twins the
‘‘Orissa Sisters’’. One child contracted tuberculosis and they were subjected to separation
surgery in an attempt to save at least one. The Parisian surgeon, Dr Doyen, attempted the
operation. According to one version of the story, contained in the aptly titled Victorian
Grotesque:
the exercise was carried out in the wildest blaze of publicty—Doyen was known as the ‘‘Barnum of
surgery’’. A promoter proposed that the operation should be done in the Cirque de Paris as the
climax of a charity gala allegedly in aid of the girls. Certainly the operation was the first to take
place with each stage being recorded by cameras. Dr Doyen was duly photographed making the
first incision ...and the sisters died amid the glare of flash-powder.
76
Publicitysurroundingthesurgicalseparationofconjoinedtwinsdatesbackatleastasfaras
Doyen’s incision on Radica and Doddica, and continues through to the death of Iranian
sisters Ladan and Laleh Bijani in July 2003. This continuity however, should not mask
the specifics of time and place, which shape the telling of stories and keeping of secrets in
high-risk, high-profile surgical interventions.
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